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I’m currently having a veridical experience; I see the banana on my desk, and it is as it 
looks to me to be (yellow and crescent‐shaped). On the basis of my experience, I know 
that the banana is yellow and crescent shaped. Call this situation the good case.2 There 
are other possible situations in which I have an experience that is subjectively 
indiscriminable from the kind of experience I have in good case – i.e., on the basis of 
introspection alone, I couldn’t tell that such an experience isn’t the kind of experience I 
have in the good case. For example, consider a situation in which I perceive nothing at 
all in my environment, and yet it still seems to me that I see a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana (perhaps because my brain is being appropriately stimulated by a fancy 
machine). Call such a situation the hallucinatory bad case.3 As a first pass, we can 
characterize disjunctivism about perceptual experience as making the following claim: 
“…the experiences in the good case and the hallucinatory bad [case] share no mental 
core, that is, there is no (experiential) mental kind that characterizes both cases” (Byrne 
and Logue 2009: ix). The rough idea is that the experiences in the good and 
hallucinatory bad cases (and veridical and hallucinatory experiences in general) are 
mental states of totally different kinds.4 
Disjunctivism has been met with considerable skepticism, much of it attributable 
to two sources. First, many suspect that disjunctivism cannot accommodate certain 
features that the hallucinatory bad case obviously has. For example, it seems obvious 
that what it would be like for me to have the hallucinatory experience (i.e., the 
experience’s phenomenal character) could be exactly the same as what it’s like for me to 
have the veridical experience. But it’s not obvious how this could be the case if the 
experiences are mental states of totally different kinds. Also, recall that the hallucinatory 
experience is subjectively indiscriminable from the kind of experience I have in the 
                                                 
1 This paper started out as a portion of my dissertation. Thanks to my dissertation 
committee (Bob Stalnaker, Steve Yablo, and especially Alex Byrne and Susanna Siegel) 
for extremely enlightening discussions concerning many of the issues it raises. An 
earlier draft of this paper was presented at a departmental seminar at the University of 
Leeds; thanks to those present for their helpful comments and questions. 
2 The ‘case’ terminology is borrowed from Williamson 2000; you can think of a case as a 
centered possible world (i.e., a possible world with a designated subject and time). In 
the case just described, the subject is me and the time is now. 
3 Another example is a situation in which a green banana looks yellow to me (perhaps 
because of unusual lighting conditions). Call such a situation the illusory bad case. I will 
not discuss what disjunctivists should say about illusory bad cases in this paper; 
however, I take up this issue in Logue ms. Since I’ll only be concerned with the 
hallucinatory bad case here, I’ll sometimes just call it ‘the bad case’ for short. 
4 While disjunctivism is typically formulated as a claim about experiences in all sense 
modalities, discussions of the view are usually restricted to visual experiences for 
simplicity’s sake. I will do the same in this paper. 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good case. But how can disjunctivism explain this fact, if the experiences in the good and 
hallucinatory cases are mental states of totally different kinds? It seems that 
disjunctivism entails that there’s nothing in virtue of which the hallucinatory experience 
is subjectively indiscriminable from the kind of experience I have in the good case. 
Second, the disjunctivist cannot rest with the claim that the hallucinatory 
experience is a mental state of a totally different kind than the experience in the good 
case. In order to fully defend the claim the experiences differ, the disjunctivist must give 
an account of what hallucination is; i.e., he must give a detailed account of what 
hallucination consists in (and the respects in which it differs from veridical experience). 
But arguably, the most popular disjunctivist accounts of hallucination face apparently 
insurmountable obstacles.  
As the title of this paper suggests, things aren’t as bad for the disjunctivist as 
these worries might lead one to believe. The apparent trouble for disjunctivism arises 
from the fact that the formulations of the view considered by its opponents aren’t 
typically constructed with sufficient attention to the view’s motivations. If we begin by 
asking why one would want to be a disjunctivist in the first place, and then formulate 
disjunctivism in light of the answer, we end up with a much more promising view. In 
particular, I will argue that disjunctivism, properly formulated, can account for the fact 
that the hallucinatory experience is indiscriminable from and phenomenally the same 
as the kind of experience I have in the good case. Moreover, a proper formulation of 
disjunctivism reveals that accounts of hallucination that have been dismissed by most 
disjunctivists as untenable are more promising than is generally supposed. 
In section 1, I will offer a formulation of disjunctivism that is rooted in its 
primary motivation (namely, preserving a view known as Naïve Realism). In section 2, I 
will explain how disjunctivism so formulated can account for the fact that the 
experiences in the good and bad cases can have the same phenomenal character. In 
section 3, I will explain how disjunctivism so formulated can account for the fact that 
the hallucinatory experience is subjectively indiscriminable from the kind of experience 
I have in the good case. In section 4, I will sketch the outlines of a disjunctivist account 
of hallucination inspired by the formulation of disjunctivism proposed in section 1. 
 
 
1. Disjunctivism outlined and refined 
 
As it’s usually stated, disjunctivism holds that the experiences in the good and 
hallucinatory cases are totally different kinds of mental state. However, as we will see in 
this section, this claim should be qualified in several ways. All of the qualifications are 
old news to a greater or lesser extent; but since not all of them are made every time 
disjunctivism is characterized, it’s worth collecting them all in one place. Moreover, the 
dialectical utility of one of the qualifications has been underappreciated—even by 
disjunctivism’s proponents. This qualification is intimately connected to the primary 
motivation for disjunctivism. In the first part of this section, I will outline this 
motivation, and in the second part, I will explain the qualifications to disjunctivism as 
I’ve characterized it so far. 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1.1. Naïve Realism 
 
The primary motivation for disjunctivism is to preserve a view known as Naïve Realism. 
Naïve Realism has been characterized in a number of ways, but it seems that the 
common theme underlying the various characterizations is the idea that veridical 
experience fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving entities in her 
environment.5 This may sound close to trivial—doesn’t practically everyone think that 
veridical experience involves the subject perceiving the world around her?6 The answer 
to this question is ‘yes’, of course, but the claim that veridical experience involves 
perceiving entities in one’s environment is not equivalent to the claim that veridical 
experience fundamentally consists in the obtaining of this perceptual relation. For 
example, many think that veridical experience involves perceiving entities, but that at 
the most fundamental psychological level it consists in the subject representing her 
environment as being a certain way (e.g., as containing a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana).7 
But what exactly does it mean to say that veridical experience fundamentally 
consists in something? Here’s M.G.F. Martin’s answer: 
 
                                                 
5 M.G.F. Martin typically characterizes Naïve Realism as involving the claim that the 
mind‐independent objects of a veridical experience are constituents of that experience 
(e.g., see his 2004: 39). This is a consequence of Naïve Realism as I’ve characterized it. 
According to my characterization, a veridical experience fundamentally consists in the 
following state of affairs: the obtaining of the perceptual relation between the subject 
and the mind‐independent objects of the experience. Thus, any constituents of this state 
of affairs are constituents of the experience (including the entities perceived). It’s not 
clear how else to understand the idea of a mind‐independent object being a constituent 
of an experience other than in terms of the experience being a state of affairs that has 
the object as a constituent; thus, I assume that Martin endorses a view along the lines of 
Naïve Realism as formulated in the main text. 
Also, William Fish characterizes Naïve Realism as a thesis specifically about the 
phenomenal character of veridical experience, viz., that its phenomenal character 
fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving entities in her environment (2009: 15, 
see also Campbell 2002: 114‐5 and Brewer 2008: 171 for similar claims). It’s possible to 
accept this claim and reject the characterization of Naïve Realism in the main text: 
perhaps a veridical experience’s phenomenal character fundamentally consists in the 
obtaining of the perceptual relation, but other aspects of veridical experience consist in 
something else entirely. I doubt that Naïve Realists intend to restrict their claim to 
phenomenal character; for one thing, such a view may not even require disjunctivism 
about perceptual experience, depending on what the other aspects of veridical 
experience are supposed to consist in. Given that Naïve Realists typically hold that 
disjunctivism is required to defend their account of veridical experience, it seems that 
the characterization of Naïve Realism in the main text is closer to what they’re 
ultimately after. 
6 Except for the idealist, who thinks that all we perceive are our own ideas. 
7 See, e.g., Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 2000, and Byrne 2001. 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…entities (both objects and events) can be classified by both species and genus; 
for all such entities there is a most specific answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ In 
relation to the mental, and to perception in particular, I will assume that for 
mental episodes or states there is a unique answer to this question which gives 
its most specific kind; it tells us what essentially the event or episode is” (2006: 
361, fn. omitted) 
 
The idea seems to be that veridical experience fundamentally consists in x just in case 
the most specific characterization of veridical experience that we can give involves x. 
However, more explanation is required to fully understand what the debate between 
the Naïve Realist and her opponents is about. In particular, something needs to be said 
about why philosophers of perception have spilled so much ink in arguing over claims 
about an experience’s most specific kind. What’s so special about the most specific 
characterization we can give of a perceptual experience?  
As the passage above hints by (apparently) identifying an experience’s most 
specific kind with the kind that specifies its essence, the answer is this: an experience’s 
most specific kind is “…the kind in virtue of which [it] has the nature it does” (Martin 
2004: 60). To illustrate, let ‘S’ stand for the most specific characterization of my 
experience (whatever it is, exactly). Here’s something special about S: my experience 
satisfies other psychological characterizations ultimately in virtue of being S. For 
example, my experience is a perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana ultimately in virtue of being S; my experience naturally gives rise to certain 
beliefs and behaviors (given certain background conditions) ultimately in virtue of 
being S. Of course, S doesn’t specify the experience’s fundamental kind by describing it 
in the language of physics. But it is supposed to specify the psychological “ground 
floor”—the most basic psychological characterization we can give of the experience. 
(Presumably, the experience falls under this psychological kind in virtue of certain non‐
psychological facts; e.g., neurological facts.) 
The debate between Naïve Realists and their opponents is essentially about what 
‘S’ picks out in the case of veridical experience. Some of the opponents think that my 
veridical experience is a perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana 
ultimately in virtue of consisting in my representing that there is a yellow, crescent­
shaped banana before me. By contrast, Naïve Realists think that my experience is a 
perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana ultimately in virtue of 
consisting in my perceiving this banana and its yellowness and crescent­shapedness. 
What about the hallucinatory experience? Since one can represent that p even if 
it’s false that p, the opponent can give the same account as above: for example, the 
hallucinatory experience is a perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana ultimately in virtue of consisting in my representing that there is a yellow, 
crescent­shaped banana before me. However, a Naïve Realist must give a completely 
different account of the hallucinatory experience: it can’t satisfy any psychological 
description in virtue of consisting in my perceiving something in my environment, 
because hallucinations by definition don’t involve perceiving any such thing. In this 
way, Naïve Realism gives rise to disjunctivism: since what the Naïve Realist says about 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the good case is just plain false of the bad case, she must come up with a totally different 
account of the latter.8 
One might be wondering: what exactly is at stake in the debate between the 
Naïve Realist and her opponents? In particular, why might we want to adopt Naïve 
Realism instead of, say, the representational account of experience sketched above? 
This is a difficult question that is beyond the scope of this paper.9 For our purposes, let’s 
just take it for granted that Naïve Realism is a view worth at least considering, and see 
whether we can secure a necessary condition of its truth—disjunctivism.10 
 
1.2. Disjunctivism formulated in light of Naïve Realism 
 
Now that we have Naïve Realism on the table as the primary motivation for 
disjunctivism, we’re in a better position to see how strong the latter has to be in order 
to accommodate the former. This is the minimum that the Naïve Realist is committed to: 
the experience in the good case fundamentally consists in my perceiving the banana 
                                                 
8 This is actually a bit too quick. Mark Johnston holds that all kinds of perceptual 
experience fundamentally consist in the perception of “sensible profiles”—i.e., 
complexes of properties and relations that are instantiated by things in the subject’s 
environment if her experience is veridical (2004: 134). The idea is that hallucinations 
typically involve perception of uninstantiated sensible profiles. So if Johnston’s view is 
correct, veridical experience and hallucination can be given a non‐disjunctivist account 
in terms of perception of sensible profiles. However, this view is only as plausible as the 
claim that we can perceive uninstantiated properties, which I find to be rather 
implausible (despite Johnston’s arguments to the contrary). I don’t have the space to 
pursue this issue here; and since the main focus of this paper is the viability of 
disjunctivism, I will set Johnston’s view aside. But it should be noted that if Johnston’s 
view is a live option, then Naïve Realism doesn’t entail disjunctivism. 
9 I will touch on this question (in a very abstract way) in discussing a certain objection 
to disjunctivism, however (in section 2). 
10 One might think that there’s a motivation for disjunctivism other than Naïve Realism: 
viz., the idea that disjunctivism provides a way out of arguments for skepticism about 
the external world (see, e.g., McDowell 1982, 2008). McDowell’s way out of skepticism 
doesn’t seem to presuppose Naïve Realism as I’ve characterized it, and so it might seem 
that there is an argument for disjunctivism that is independent of Naïve Realism. But 
arguably, this appearance is illusory: the view that McDowell argues for doesn’t seem to 
be a thesis about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. Rather, it seems to be a 
thesis about the evidence a perceptual experience provides its subject—very roughly, 
that a veridical experience provides much better perceptual evidence for certain 
propositions about one’s environment than a subjectively indiscriminable non‐veridical 
experience would. And at least prima facie, this claim could be accommodated by a 
variety of theories of experience’s metaphysical structure. Thus, it seems plausible that 
‘disjunctivism’ as used by McDowell picks out a different view than the one under 
discussion here. (For more on the distinction between “metaphysical” and 
“epistemological” disjunctivism, see Byrne and Logue 2008, section 4.) 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(and certain of its properties)11, and the experience in the hallucinatory bad case 
fundamentally consists in something else. 
Disjunctivism got its name from the idea that the proper account of, say, an 
experience as of a yellow banana is disjunctive: either the subject veridically perceives a 
yellow banana, or she has a non‐veridical experience as of a yellow banana, and these 
two disjuncts describe completely different states of affairs (hence the label 
‘disjunctivism’). This characterization should be regarded as very loose—since Naïve 
Realism is compatible with all sorts of commonalities across the cases, disjunctivism 
should be formulated so as to be compatible with such commonalities as well. 
First, Naïve Realism is intended to be compatible with the existence of neural 
commonalities across the cases. For example, suppose that the experiences in the good 
and bad cases have the same proximate neural cause. The Naïve Realist says that the 
experiences produced are of different fundamental kinds (in the sense outlined in the 
previous subsection); the experience in the good case fundamentally consists in my 
perceiving the banana, while the experience in the bad case consists in something else 
entirely.12 
So, as a second pass, we might restrict disjunctivism to the claim that there are 
no experiential commonalities across the cases. But this characterization would be too 
strong: in both the good and bad cases, I’m having a perceptual experience. That’s an 
experiential commonality if anything is, and not one that the Naïve Realist (or anyone) 
should deny. This is why Hinton, who is often credited as the founding father of 
disjunctivism, characterizes the view as denying that there is a “…kind of experience 
common and peculiar” to the good and bad cases (1973: 62, emphasis in text). 
Following suit, Alex Byrne and I characterized disjunctivism as follows: “…the 
experiences in the good case and the hallucinatory bad cases share no mental core, that 
is, there is no (experiential) mental kind that characterizes both cases. More exactly, 
there is no such reasonably specific kind…” (2009: ix). So, as a third pass, we might 
characterize disjunctivism as the claim that there are no reasonably specific experiential 
commonalities across the cases—e.g., specific enough not to characterize a case in 
which I’m having an experience as of a red, round tomato.  
                                                 
11 For ease of exposition, I’ll leave out ‘and certain of its properties’ in further 
descriptions of the Naïve Realist account of veridical experience. 
12 Some think that this claim runs afoul of a “same cause, same effect” principle (e.g., see 
Robinson 1994, chapter 6). The idea is that if the experiences in the good and bad cases 
have the same proximate neural cause, then the experiences must be mentally exactly 
alike (and thus be of the same fundamental kind). I won’t discuss this objection here, as 
it has been exhaustively addressed by Martin (see his 2004: 55‐7). The basic idea 
behind his response is that the principle employed assumes that being in a certain 
neural state is sufficient for bringing about the experience in the good case, but that 
begs the question against Naïve Realism (which holds that veridical experiences have 
mind‐independent objects as constituents, and thus that neural activity cannot be 
sufficient for a veridical experience). In any case, the important point for our purposes 
here is that disjunctivism isn’t supposed to entail that the good and bad cases have no 
neural commonalities. Although one might think that disjunctivism is falsified by the 
existence of such commonalities, all parties to the debate recognize that disjunctivism is 
at least intended to be compatible with them. 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But again, this characterization would be too strong: in both the good and bad 
cases, I’m having a perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. This 
characterization is specific enough not to characterize a case in which I’m having an 
experience as of a red, round tomato, but it does characterize both the good and bad 
cases. Moreover, the Naïve Realist has no reason to deny this reasonably specific 
commonality—all she needs to say is that the ultimate psychological facts in virtue of 
which the bad case experience is an experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana 
are different than the ultimate psychological facts in virtue of which the good case 
experience is of that kind.  
So let this be our fourth and final pass: according to disjunctivism, the good and 
bad cases have no reasonably specific, fundamental experiential commonalities. A 
reasonably specific experiential commonality is fundamental just in case it 
characterizes what the experiences fundamentally consist in, i.e., each experience 
satisfies all other psychological characterizations ultimately in virtue of having the 
common property. This seems to be what Martin is after when he characterizes 
disjunctivism as a view that “…seeks to resist the rejection of Naïve Realism…by 
insisting that the fundamental kind of event that one’s sensory experience which is a 
veridical perception of the table in front of one is is a kind of event which just could not 
occur were one hallucinating” (2004: 43). For we’ve finally reached a commonality that 
the Naïve Realist cannot accommodate: the good case experience fundamentally 
consists in my perceiving the banana, but the bad case experience must fundamentally 
consist in something else. Thus, the good and bad cases cannot have any reasonably 
specific, fundamental experiential commonalities.13 
While at least some disjunctivists make this “fundamentality” qualification in 
articulating the view,14 it is rarely made explicitly (if at all) in characterizations offered 
by the view’s critics.15 This is unfortunate; for as we will see in the following sections, 
this qualification is crucial to disjunctivism’s plausibility. 
                                                 
13 Alex Byrne and I have argued that the mere denial of reasonably specific, 
fundamental experiential commonalities isn’t sufficient for disjunctivism on the 
following grounds: Hinton is widely regarded as the founder of disjunctivism, and he 
explicitly denied that the good and bad cases had any reasonably specific experiential 
commonalities. But “…if disjunctivism allows that there is a mental element common to 
the good and bad cases, then Hinton’s characterization of the view is incorrect—an 
undesirable result” (2008: 81). I’ve changed my mind. Arguably, we shouldn’t hold our 
characterization of disjunctivism hostage to Hinton. Hinton’s main argument for his 
version of disjunctivism was the claim that it had default status; a claim for which he 
offered little in the way of argument. And while Martin went to great lengths to supply 
the missing argument (see his 2004, section 3), the one he supplies is problematic (as 
Byrne and I have argued: see our 2008: 73‐9). In short, given that the primary 
motivation for disjunctivism is Naïve Realism, the most charitable characterization of 
disjunctivism is the weakest claim required to preserve it. 
14 In addition to the Martin quote above, see, e.g., Martin 2006: 360‐1, Fish 2009: 36‐7, 
and Soteriou 2009: section 2.1.1. 
15 See the characterizations of disjunctivism offered in, e.g., Burge 2005: 25, Lowe 2008: 
99, Smith 2008: 82, and Byrne and Logue 2009: ix. For exceptions, see Siegel 2008: 205 
and Sturgeon 2008: 116. 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Note that disjunctivism as I’ve formulated it doesn’t incorporate a particular 
account of either “disjunct”. This contrasts with many formulations of disjunctivism 
found in the literature. For example, some formulate disjunctivism in such a way that it 
entails, or at least strongly suggests, that Naïve Realism is true.16 And some formulate 
disjunctivism in such a way that it entails, or at least strongly suggests, a particular way 
of accounting for hallucination.17 The latter should be avoided: even if a particular 
account of hallucination compatible with disjunctivism is implausible, it doesn’t follow 
that disjunctivism itself is implausible (given that there may be alternative accounts of 
hallucination in the offing). And although disjunctivism should be formulated in light of 
Naïve Realism, it shouldn’t be formulated so as to entail Naïve Realism. For at this stage 
of inquiry, it’s conceivable that Naïve Realism will turn out to be considerably more 
plausible than disjunctivism. In that case, we should re‐evaluate the argument that 
Naïve Realism requires disjunctivism (so that we don’t throw out the baby with the 
bathwater).18 Alternatively, it’s conceivable that disjunctivism will turn out to be 
considerably more plausible than Naïve Realism. Even if it turns out that the primary 
motivation for disjunctivism is implausible, it would still be good to keep tabs on 
whether disjunctivism is available for any other theoretical purposes we might want to 
put it to. For these reasons, it’s best not to muddy the waters by mixing the bare 
minimum comparative claim about the good and bad cases that the Naïve Realist is 
committed to with specific accounts of either the good case or the bad one. 
Now that we’ve arrived at this bare minimum comparative claim, let us see how 
it fares against the objections made against disjunctivism. 
 
 
2. Disjunctivism and phenomenal character 
 
As I noted at the start, what it’s like for me to have a hallucination as of a yellow, 
crescent‐shaped banana could be exactly what it’s like for me to veridically perceive the 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana sitting on my desk right now. That is, the experiences in 
the good case and the bad case could have exactly the same phenomenal character. This 
seems as plain as day: after all, when I imagine what it would be like to have a 
hallucination as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana, I do so by imagining having an 
experience with exactly the same phenomenal character as the veridical one I’m 
currently having. However, given that sameness of phenomenal character would be a 
reasonably specific, fundamental experiential commonality across the cases, then 
disjunctivism as outlined above entails that the experiences cannot have the same 
phenomenal character. 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Snowdon 2005: 136‐7, Siegel 2008: 205, and Sturgeon 2008: 116. 
17 See, e.g., Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2006: 146. Martin also sometimes incorporates 
his preferred account of hallucination into his characterization of disjunctivism, which, 
incidentally, is why he suggests that the mere denial that hallucinations can be of the 
same fundamental psychological kind as veridical experience would not “…capture the 
key thought behind disjunctivism” (2006: 368). 
18 For example, we might want to reconsider the non‐disjunctivist version of Naïve 
Realism articulated by Johnston (see fn. 8 above). 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One disjunctivist response is to bite the bullet and embrace the conclusion that 
the experiences cannot have the same phenomenal character. William Fish goes so far 
as to suggest that hallucinations lack phenomenal character entirely (2009: 81). On his 
view, there’s nothing it’s like to hallucinate, although the subject of a hallucination 
mistakenly believes that her experience has phenomenal character. Fish goes to great 
lengths to defend this view, but one might wonder: is such an extreme and revisionary 
position the disjunctivist’s only option? 
I think not. Rather than accepting the claim that the experiences in the good and 
hallucinatory cases cannot have the same phenomenal character, the disjunctivist can 
instead reject a presupposition of the problem posed. In particular: the conclusion that 
the experiences cannot have the same phenomenal character was generated using the 
assumption that sameness of phenomenal character would be a reasonably specific, 
fundamental experiential commonality across the cases. Now, the phenomenal 
commonality under discussion would certainly be an experiential one, and it would be 
specific enough not to characterize a case in which I see a red, round tomato (what it 
would be like to see a red, round tomato would of course be very different). But is it a 
fundamental experiential commonality?  
Arguably, no. When we’re giving a theory of perceptual experience, part of what 
we’re trying to do is to say what it is in virtue of which experiences have the 
phenomenal character they do. This claim is supported by the fact that non­disjunctivists 
typically treat phenomenal character as non‐fundamental. The opponent of Naïve 
Realism discussed in section 1, for instance, thinks that the experiences in the good and 
bad cases have the specific phenomenal character they do in virtue of my perceptually 
representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before me—e.g., if an 
experience’s phenomenal character supervenes on its representational content, then 
the experience has the phenomenal character it does in virtue of its consisting in the 
subject’s representing her environment as being a certain way. Alternatively, a non‐
disjunctivist of another stripe might account for phenomenal character in terms of 
intrinsically non‐representational qualia: on such a view, the experiences in the good 
and bad cases have the specific phenomenal character they do in virtue of instantiating 
the same types of qualia.19  Similarly, the Naïve Realist would say that the good case 
experience has the phenomenal character it does in virtue of my perceiving the banana 
and some of its properties, while the experience in the bad case has its phenomenal 
character in virtue of something else. In short, the disjunctivist can say that the 
experiences in the good and bad cases have the same phenomenal character, because 
the phenomenal commonality isn’t a fundamental one. Although the facts in virtue of 
which the experiences have this phenomenal character are different, the experiences 
are phenomenally the same.20 
One might be uncomfortable with this proposal for the following reason: 
according to the disjunctivist, there’s no explanation of the fact that the experiences in 
the good and bad cases have the same phenomenal character. If the experience in the 
                                                 
19 For a view along these lines, see Block 1996. 
20 Martin considers and rejects a similar proposal because he believes it is incompatible 
with his specific account of hallucination (see his 2006: 372). However, since I will grant 
the opponent of disjunctivism that his account of hallucination is false for the sake of 
argument in section 4, we need not worry about this issue here. 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good case has its phenomenal character in virtue of my perceiving a banana, and the 
experience in the bad case has its phenomenal character in virtue of something else 
entirely, it appears to be nothing more than a brute fact that what it’s like to have the 
experiences is the same. There’s no underlying commonality we can appeal to in order 
to explain why what it’s like to have one is the same as what it’s like to have the other. 
However, upon reflection, it’s not clear whether discomfort with the proposal is 
warranted on such grounds. First, one might wonder whether it is the job of our theory 
of perceptual experience to explain why the experiences are phenomenally the same. 
Instead of explaining phenomenal sameness in terms of psychological sameness, we 
could explain phenomenal sameness in terms of neurological sameness or similarity. 
For example, the disjunctivist could say that the reason why the experiences in the good 
and bad cases have the same phenomenal character is that they are both the results of 
the same kind of neural processing.21 
However, suppose that the disjunctivist cannot explain why the experiences are 
fundamentally the same. Why exactly is this a mark against the view? In particular, why 
do we need an explanation of the fact that experiences are phenomenally the same? 
Given that there are surely brute facts somewhere in nature, why can’t this be one of 
them? 
One might respond by suggesting that the point of giving a philosophical theory 
of perceptual experience in the first place is to explain why veridical and hallucinatory 
experiences can have the same phenomenal character. This may well be right. But 
presumably this isn’t our only aim. We have other aims in theorizing about perceptual 
experience as well (e.g., illuminating its epistemological role). It might turn out that no 
one theory of perceptual experience can do everything we want it to. Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that the only theory that can provide a satisfactory account of 
experience’s epistemological role cannot explain why veridical and hallucinatory 
experiences can have the same phenomenal character. In that case, we’d have to figure 
out which desideratum is more important. 
To be perfectly clear: I’m not claiming that we are in a dialectical situation like 
this. I’m simply claiming that, for all that’s been said here, it’s an epistemic possibility.  
My point is this: one cannot simply dismiss disjunctivism on the grounds that it fails to 
satisfy one desideratum on a theory of perceptual experience. For there are other 
desiderata, and maybe—just maybe—disjunctivism is a necessary condition on 
satisfying one of them. 
Figuring out whether or not this is the case would require a systematic investigation 
into what exactly the desiderata of a philosophical theory of perceptual experience are, 
and whether Naïve Realism is uniquely positioned to satisfy any of them. Those tasks 
are beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that we 
cannot dismiss disjunctivism on the basis of this objection without having first carried 
out these tasks. 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Thau 2004: 249 for a proposal along these lines. Of course, this strategy wouldn’t 
explain phenomenal commonalities across the good case and a hallucinatory case in 
which the subject is an alien with a radically different perceptual apparatus from mine. 
In cases like this, the disjunctivist would have to fall back on the next response. 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3. Disjunctivism and indiscriminability 
 
We’ve just considered an objection to disjunctivism to the effect that it cannot account 
for the fact that the experiences in the good and bad cases have the same phenomenal 
character. One might raise an analogous objection in terms of subjective 
indiscriminability. An experience is subjectively indiscriminable from a kind of 
experience K just in case one is not in a position to know by introspection alone that it 
isn’t one of the K’s.22 The experience in the hallucinatory bad case is subjectively 
indiscriminable from the kind of experience I’m having in the good case, viz., a veridical 
experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana—I’m not in a position to know by 
introspection alone that my experience in the bad case isn’t a veridical experience of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. But we might ask: in virtue of what does the 
hallucinatory experience have this indiscriminability property? We tend to suppose that 
indiscriminability facts are (typically) grounded in commonalities.23 To illustrate: Let’s 
say that an object o is perceptually indiscriminable from the kind yellow crescent­shaped 
banana iff it is not possible to know by perception alone that o isn’t a yellow crescent‐
shaped banana. We might ask: in virtue of what does a given object have this 
indiscriminability property? The natural answer is that it has this property in virtue of 
having other properties in common with yellow, crescent‐shaped bananas: in particular, 
yellowness and crescent‐shapedness. I can’t tell that the object isn’t a yellow, crescent‐
shaped banana just by looking at it because it is exactly the same color and shape as 
such a banana. But it might seem that the disjunctivist cannot make an analogous move 
to explain the fact that my experience in the bad case is subjectively indiscriminable 
from the kind of experience I have in the good case, as she denies that the cases have 
any reasonably specific, fundamental experiential commonalities.  
In light of the proposal made in the previous section, the reader might spot the 
gap in this reasoning straight away. For perhaps we could explain the fact that my 
                                                 
22 This explication of the subjective indiscriminability relation is due to Martin (see his 
2004 and 2006). Note that phenomenal sameness and subjective indiscriminability are 
distinct but closely related. If what it’s like to have a hallucination is the same as what 
it’s like to have a certain kind of veridical experience, then presumably the hallucination 
is subjectively indiscriminable from that kind of veridical experience. (For it’s not clear 
how one could discriminate the hallucination from that kind of veridical experience on 
the basis of introspection if it’s phenomenally exactly like veridical experiences of that 
kind.) But the converse doesn’t hold: if a hallucination is subjectively indiscriminable 
from a certain kind of veridical experience, it still could be phenomenally different from 
experiences of that kind (perhaps the phenomenal difference is so slight that it’s 
inaccessible to even careful introspection). (By ‘introspection’, I just mean the 
distinctive way one has of coming to know about one’s own mental states—whatever 
that is, exactly.) 
23 Except when the indiscriminability is the result of unconsciousness, lack of cognitive 
sophistication, etc. If Merly is not able to tell by introspection that she’s not veridically 
perceiving a yellow banana because she’s in a coma, or because she’s a cat and thus 
incapable of forming beliefs about her experiences, the fact that her state is subjectively 
indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a yellow banana is solely due to her 
cognitive deficits (rather than to any commonalities between the situations). 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experience in the bad case is subjectively indiscriminable from the kind of experience I 
have in the good case in terms of non­fundamental experiential commonalities across 
the cases. Now, some non‐fundamental experiential commonalities are clearly poorly 
suited to this task. Both cases involve a perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐
shaped banana, for example. But it won’t do to explain the indiscriminability fact in 
terms of this commonality. What we’re after is an answer to the following question: In 
virtue of what is my hallucinatory perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical perceptual experience as of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana? Simply saying that both cases involve a perceptual 
experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana fails to shed any light on the answer 
to this question. 
However, there is another potential explanation of the indiscriminability fact: 
namely, that the experience in the bad case has the same phenomenal character as a 
veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. What it’s like for me to 
hallucinate a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana in the bad case is the same as what it’s 
like for me to veridically perceive a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana in the good case, 
and my hallucination is subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana in virtue of this phenomenal commonality.  
The first proposal failed because it cast part of the explanandum as explanans: 
the task is to explain the subjective indiscriminability of one perceptual experience of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana from a certain kind of perceptual experience as of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana, and so an attempt to explain the indiscriminability fact 
in terms of both cases involving a perceptual experience as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana would miss the point. By contrast, the phenomenal character of the experiences 
isn’t the explanandum in this context, so it’s a legitimate candidate for explanans. Of 
course, phenomenal character is an explanandum in its own right; ultimately, we want 
to know the facts in virtue of which a given experience has the phenomenal character it 
does. But that doesn’t mean phenomenal character doesn’t have its own explanatory 
roles to play. 
But suppose that the disjunctivist cannot account for the indiscriminability fact 
in this way.24 She could respond to the demand for an explanation of the 
indiscriminability fact in the same way as she should respond to the demand for an 
explanation of the fact that the experiences in the good and bad cases are phenomenally 
the same. That is, she could explain the fact in terms of neurological commonalities 
rather than psychological ones. Or, failing that, she could question the demand for such 
an explanation in the first place. Explaining the indiscriminability fact is just one 
                                                 
24 As we’ll see in the next section, some disjunctivists hold that hallucinations are 
fundamentally states that are subjectively indiscriminable from veridical experiences of 
a certain kind. In section 2, I proposed that a hallucination has its phenomenal character 
in virtue of whatever the disjunctivist wants to say it fundamentally consists in. But if a 
hallucination fundamentally consists in being subjectively indiscriminable from a 
veridical experience of a certain kind, and thus has its phenomenal character in virtue of 
this indiscriminability property, then it doesn’t have this indiscriminability property in 
virtue of its phenomenal character (given that the relation expressed by ‘in virtue of’ is 
asymmetric). Thus, a proponent of such an account of hallucination will have to fall back 
on the response I’m about to propose. 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desideratum of a theory of perceptual experience among many; and given that it’s an 
open question whether Naïve Realism is uniquely positioned to satisfy a more 
important desideratum, a failure to explain the indiscriminability fact shouldn’t be 
assumed to be a deal breaker. 
 
 
4. How should the disjunctivist account for hallucination? 
 
So far, I’ve argued that disjunctivism can accommodate (i) the fact that the experiences 
in the good and bad cases can have the same phenomenal character, and (ii) the fact 
that the hallucination in the bad case is subjectively indiscriminable from the kind of 
experience I have in the good case, all the while maintaining that the experiences 
involved are fundamentally different. But of course, it’s not enough for the disjunctivist 
to say that hallucination consists in something fundamentally different than what 
veridical experience consists in. He also owes us a substantive account of hallucination. 
Hallucination cannot consist in what the Naïve Realist says veridical experience 
fundamentally consists in (viz., perception of things in one’s environment). So what does 
hallucination fundamentally consist in, if not that? The key to the disjunctivist 
responses to (i) and (ii) was to appeal the fact that disjunctivism, charitably construed 
in light of its primary motivation (preserving Naïve Realism), allows for non­
fundamental experiential commonalities across the good and bad cases. The aim of this 
section is to exploit this feature of disjunctivism in order to defend a way of accounting 
for hallucination that has been too hastily dismissed.  
There are two broad types of substantive disjunctivist accounts of hallucination: 
positive and negative accounts.25 A negative account characterizes hallucination in 
terms of veridical experience. For example, Martin’s preferred account of hallucination 
is that it fundamentally consists in subjective indiscriminability from a veridical 
experience of a certain kind—e.g., the most basic mental characterization of the 
experience in the hallucinatory bad case is that it is an experience that I can’t tell apart 
from a veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana just by introspecting. In 
this account, hallucination is characterized “…solely by saying that it is like what it is 
not” (Dancy 1995: 436). 
By contrast, a positive account of hallucination characterizes it independently of 
veridical experience. Dancy, for one, finds such an account preferable: as he says, 
“…there may be available a more direct characterization of the second disjunct, and in a 
totally explicit version of the theory it would indeed be characterized in that better 
way” (Dancy 1995: 436, emphasis mine). For example, a disjunctivist might hold that 
while veridical experience fundamentally consists in perceiving mind‐independent 
objects, hallucination fundamentally consists in representing one’s environment as being 
a certain way, or in acquaintance with mind­dependent objects and their properties. 
                                                 
25 The ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ terminology is borrowed from Byrne and Logue 2008: 
69, although used differently here. (Here I’m counting being subjectively 
indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a certain kind as a reasonably specific 
experiential property, which leads to a different account of what negative disjunctivism 
is.) 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Notice that these characterizations of hallucination don’t mention veridical experience 
at all. 
Martin doesn’t think that positive disjunctivism is a viable option. In this section, 
I will begin by outlining his case against positive disjunctivism, and present the version 
of negative disjunctivism that he endorses in light of this argument (along with a sketch 
of some of the obstacles his view faces). Next, I will argue that Martin’s case against 
positive disjunctivism fails, and that proper recognition of the fact that disjunctivism 
permits non‐fundamental experiential commonalities across the good and bad cases 
opens the door to a promising version of positive disjunctivism. 
 
4.1. Martin’s case against positive disjunctivism 
 
Martin’s argument against positive disjunctivism has two stages. First, he argues that if 
positive disjunctivism is true, the good and bad cases have a reasonably specific 
experiential commonality. Second, he argues that the reasonably specific experiential 
commonality would also be a fundamental one, thus undermining disjunctivism. 
Suppose that positive disjunctivism is true—say, that hallucination 
fundamentally consists in representing one’s environment as being a certain way. 
Arguably, there is a type of neural state that is the proximate cause of the experience in 
the bad case. Given that hallucination consists in perceptual representation, then this 
type of neural state is sufficient for my entering into a certain representational state: 
say, my perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before 
me. Plausibly, such a neural state could be the proximate cause of my experience in the 
good case, and it is hard to deny that this neural state would be sufficient for my 
entering into the same kind of representational state in that case.26 In short, the idea is 
that if representational properties (or any other kind of reasonably specific experiential 
property) are allowed into the account of hallucination, then they can’t be kept out of 
the account of veridical experience. Thus, positive disjunctivism entails that the good 
and bad cases have a reasonably specific experiential commonality (e.g., my 
perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before me). 
So far, disjunctivism as we’ve characterized it remains intact. The first stage of 
Martin’s argument has established that positive disjunctivism entails that there are 
reasonably specific experiential commonalities across the good and bad cases. But as I 
argued above, disjunctivism is perfectly compatible with such commonalities. The next 
stage of Martin’s argument aims to show that the sort of reasonably specific experiential 
properties the positive disjunctivist would appeal to in her account of hallucination are 
bound to constitute fundamental commonalities across the cases. 
Suppose that the good and bad cases have the reasonably specific experiential 
commonality of my perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana before me. The cases will also have other reasonably specific experiential 
commonalities (experiences as of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana and their 
phenomenal character), as well as doxastic and behavioral commonalities (in both 
cases, I believe that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before me, and I’ll reach 
                                                 
26  For a much more thorough presentation and discussion of this argument, see Martin 
2004: 52‐8. Since I will grant Martin this part of his argument against positive 
disjunctivism, there’s no need to rehearse the details here. 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out and grasp it if I fancy a banana‐flavored snack). Now, how do all these aspects of the 
cases fit together? Recall that what an experience fundamentally consists in is that in 
virtue of which it satisfies all other psychological characterizations—its psychological 
“ground floor”, if you like. It’s tempting to say that the phenomenal, doxastic, and 
behavioral commonalities obtain ultimately in virtue of the representational 
commonality—my experience has the phenomenal character it does, and the doxastic 
and behavioral effects it does, ultimately in virtue of the fact that I perceptually 
represent my environment as being a certain way. That is, it’s quite tempting to say that 
the experiences in both cases fundamentally consist in perceptual representation. 
However, the Naïve Realist cannot yield to this temptation, since she holds that 
the ultimate psychological ground of my veridical experience’s phenomenal character, 
doxastic effects, and behavioral effects is the fact that I perceive the banana on my desk. 
Even worse, it seems that the Naïve Realist cannot reasonably insist on this for the good 
case while holding that the experience in the bad case fundamentally consists in 
perceptual representation. For what the experiences have in common (phenomenal 
character, etc.) is most naturally accounted for in terms of something else they have in 
common (e.g., consisting in perceptual representation). As Martin puts the worry: 
 
We have the same resultant phenomena in introspectively matching cases of 
perception and hallucination, and we know…that where we have causally 
matching situations we have the same kinds of event in hallucination and in 
perception. So the common kind of event between hallucination and perception 
seems better correlated with these common phenomena than the kind of event 
unique to perception and so seems to screen off the purely perceptual kind of 
event from giving us an explanation (Martin 2004: 62). 
 
In short, the idea is that if we admit reasonably specific experiential commonalities 
across the good and hallucinatory cases, they will effectively “screen off” the obtaining 
of the perceptual relation from playing the role the Naïve Realist claims it does (i.e., 
serving as the ultimate psychological ground of phenomenal character, doxastic effects, 
and so forth).27  
                                                 
27 For the details of the “screening off” argument, see Martin 2004: 58‐68; for discussion 
of this argument, see Byrne and Logue 2008: 83‐7. Martin suggests that even if the 
reasonably specific experiential property had by hallucinations is also had by veridical 
experiences, the obtaining of the perceptual relation could still do some explanatory 
work: e.g., it could be the ultimate psychological ground of the fact that a subject 
believes certain singular propositions. However, Martin still worries that the presence 
of such a reasonably specific experiential property in a case of veridical experience 
would screen off the obtaining of the perceptual relation from explaining the 
experience’s phenomenal character, and “[i]t would be a severe limitation on the 
disjunctivist’s commitment to Naïve Realism, if the Naïve Realist aspects of perception 
[i.e., the obtaining of the perceptual relation] could not themselves shape the contours 
of the subject’s conscious experience” (2004: 64). (For a recent detailed critical 
discussion of Martin’s “screening off” argument, see Hellie forthcoming. I should note 
that the arguments presented in that paper also impugn the version of disjunctivism I 
will defend, but I do not have the space to respond to them here.) 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To review: on the basis of quite plausible causal considerations, we can show 
that any positive characterization of hallucination results in a reasonably specific 
experiential commonality across the good and bad cases. And on the basis of quite 
plausible considerations about how best to account for certain properties the cases 
have in common, it seems that such a reasonably specific experiential commonality will 
also be a fundamental one. Since disjunctivism holds that there are no reasonably 
specific fundamental experiential commonalities across the cases, it appears that 
positive disjunctivism is self‐undermining. 
 
4.2. Negative disjunctivism 
 
If Martin is right that the disjunctivist cannot give a positive account of hallucination (as 
most have taken him to be), he must give a negative account. As mentioned above, 
Martin’s proposal is that the mental nature of a “causally matching” hallucination, i.e., a 
hallucination with the same proximate neural cause as veridical experiences of a certain 
kind, is exhausted by the property of being subjectively indiscriminable from veridical 
experiences of that kind (Martin 2004: 71).28 For example, the experience in the bad 
case simply consists in the property of being subjectively indiscriminable from a 
veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana.  Of course, the experience in 
the good case has this indiscriminability property trivially (nothing is discriminable 
from a kind of which it is in fact an instance). But Martin argues that this property 
doesn’t “screen off” the obtaining of the perceptual relation on the grounds that the 
explanatory power of the former is dependent on the explanatory power of the latter 
(2004: 70). Plausibly, being in a state that is subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical 
experience of a yellow banana can play a role in explaining, say, my belief that there is a 
yellow banana before me only if actually perceiving a yellow banana can play such an 
explanatory role. To borrow an example of Martin’s: that James was in a state 
subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a big fat hairy spider 
wouldn’t explain his shrieking if his veridically perceiving such a spider couldn’t explain 
his shrieking either (Martin 2004: 68).29 
                                                 
28 Since Martin’s argument against positive disjunctivism applies only to causally 
matching hallucinations, it doesn’t compel us to reject positive disjunctivism for 
hallucinations that don’t have the same proximate neural cause as a veridical experience 
of some kind. However, it’s not entirely obvious that there are any hallucinations of the 
latter variety (although, of course, they cannot be ruled out a priori). 
29 Although I won’t be defending Martin’s account of hallucination, I should note two 
ways in which it interacts with proposals advanced in previous sections. First, as I 
explained above in note 24, accounts of hallucination in terms of subjective 
indiscriminability are incompatible with explaining said indiscriminability in terms of 
shared phenomenal character. Second, as I mentioned in footnote 20, Martin considers 
and rejects a proposal along the lines of the one defended in section 2; viz., that the 
experiences in the good and bad cases have the same phenomenal character in virtue of 
different facts. He rejects it because he believes it is incompatible with his account of 
hallucination (2006: 372). For the record, I’m not convinced that this is the case. 
However, since I will grant the disjunctivist’s opponent that Martin’s account of 
hallucination is false for the sake of argument, we need not delve into this issue here. 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 This account of hallucination has been subject to intense scrutiny, and it’s far 
from clear that it has withstood said scrutiny. A thorough investigation of the objections 
is beyond the scope of this paper; I’ll just summarize one of them to give the reader a 
sense of the obstacles this account of hallucination faces. One powerful objection stems 
from the fact that Martin characterizes subjective indiscriminability in terms of 
knowability: an experience is subjectively indiscriminable from a certain kind of 
veridical experience iff it is not possible for the subject to know by introspection alone 
that her experience isn’t of that kind. Given this characterization of subjective 
indiscriminability, the possibility of “cognitively unsophisticated” hallucinators 
constitutes a challenge for Martin’s account. A toad, say, can have a hallucination as of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped thing, but arguably it doesn’t have beliefs (and therefore 
knowledge) about anything. Such a creature’s hallucination as of a yellow, crescent‐
shaped banana is indiscriminable from any other kind of mental state—the toad is never 
able to know that the mental state it’s in isn’t of any given kind, simply because the toad 
isn’t able to know anything.30 On Martin’s proposal, a hallucination as of a yellow, 
crescent‐shaped banana fundamentally consists in the property of being subjectively 
indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. But on 
what grounds can Martin claim that a toad’s hallucination fundamentally consists in this 
particular indiscriminability property, when it has so many others (e.g., the property of 
being subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a red tomato, or the 
property of being subjectively indiscriminable from a desire to eat more flies)? 
Martin responds to the objection from cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators 
by articulating a notion of impersonal (in)discriminability (2004: 75‐6, 2006: 379‐96). 
The idea is that while a toad’s hallucination as of a yellow, crescent shaped banana is 
subjectively indiscriminable from all kinds of mental states for the toad given its 
cognitive capacities (or lack thereof), there is still a perspective from which the toad’s 
hallucination is subjectively discriminable from, say, a veridical experience of a red, 
round tomato, and is non‐trivially subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical 
experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana.  
However, Siegel (2008) argues that this appeal to impersonal indiscriminability 
runs into trouble once we try to specify what it amounts to. She suggests that the most 
natural explication of impersonal indiscriminability is in terms of a counterfactual about 
knowledge, such as the following: if an “ideal introspector” were in the toad’s situation, 
she would not be able to know by introspection alone that she was not having a 
veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. However, we must ask: what 
is it to be in the toad’s “situation”? Plausibly, to be in the toad’s situation is to be 
hallucinating a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana, which, according to the account of 
hallucination under consideration, just is being in a state that is indiscriminable by 
introspection alone from a veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. 
But now the proposed explication of impersonal indiscriminability is trivial: it says that 
if an “ideal introspector” were in a state such that she couldn’t know by introspection 
alone that it wasn’t a veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana, then she 
would not be able to know by introspection alone that she was not having a veridical 
experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. Any attempt to explicate impersonal 
indiscriminability in terms of a counterfactual about knowledge will result in a trivial 
                                                 
30 For a related objection, see Siegel 2008: 210‐4. 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claim, because any such counterfactual will make reference to the toad’s “situation” 
(which, by Martin’s lights, can be specified only in terms of indiscriminability). Thus, it 
appears that there is no non‐trivial explication of impersonal indiscriminability 
available to a disjunctivist of Martin’s stripe.31 
An appeal to the notion of impersonal indiscriminability isn’t the only possible 
response to the problem posed by cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators. In order to 
explain how a frog can subjectively discriminate its banana‐hallucination from, say, a 
desire to eat more flies, one might appeal to a less sophisticated cognitive notion in 
explicating subjective indiscriminability (e.g., Sosa’s “animal knowledge” as outlined in 
his 1991), or one might offer an alternative characterization of subjective 
indiscriminability, one not in terms of knowledge (e.g., Fish’s account of subjective 
indiscriminability in terms of experiences’ effects in his 2008 and 2009: Ch. 4). 
However, as Siegel argues, these strategies face their own problems.32  
I’ve only presented a small sliver of the debate about indiscriminability accounts 
of hallucination to give a sense of how complicated it is; on the basis of what’s been said 
here, we’re certainly not in a position to conclude that negative disjunctivism is 
hopeless. However, I will concede this to the disjunctivist’s opponent for the sake of 
argument. For I don’t think that the failure of negative disjunctivism means the failure 
of disjunctivism. In the last part of this paper, I will argue that Martin’s case against 
positive disjunctivism is flawed, and sketch the beginnings of a positive account of 
hallucination. 
 
                                                 
31 The dialectic is more complicated than I’ve let on. As Siegel notes, Martin recognizes 
the difficulties of giving a counterfactual account of impersonal indiscriminability 
(2006: 383). Martin’s alternative derives from his conception of introspection, which is 
basically that it is not a mode of accessing some bit of reality that exists independently 
of that access. Rather, one’s experience is constituted by one’s introspective awareness 
of it: “[i]t seeming to the subject that things seem a certain way to her can constitute 
things seeming that way to her” (Martin 2006: 395). Given this conception of 
introspection, “[t]hat which in us is simply a mode of self‐awareness is what we 
attribute to other creatures even when we do not take them to be self‐aware. So [the 
negative disjunctivist can] attribute experience to the dog through attributing a specific 
take on the world, without thereby supposing that the dog is self‐aware” (Martin 2006: 
395, emphasis mine). The idea seems to be that we can explicate the notion of 
impersonal indiscriminability in terms of having a “specific take on the world”. But what 
is it to have a specific take on the world? Martin reminds us that this shouldn’t be 
explicated in terms of a counterfactual (2006: 396, fn. 44). In the absence of another 
explanation of what having a specific take on the world amounts to, however, this 
alternative is unconvincing. 
32 For Siegel’s response to the “animal knowledge” strategy, see her 2008: 213‐4. For 
her criticism of Fish’s alternative account of subjective indiscriminability, see her 2008: 
214‐7; for Fish’s response, see his 2009: 99‐100, 103‐104. For considerations that can 
be marshaled in further objections to indiscriminability accounts of hallucination, see 
Siegel 2008: 218‐23, 2004: 93‐5, Johnston 2004: 124‐7, and Sturgeon 2006: 208‐10. 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4.3. Positive disjunctivism revisited 
 
Recall that Martin’s argument against positive disjunctivism had two stages. First, the 
causal argument: on the basis of the fact that a hallucination can have the same 
proximate neural cause as a veridical experience, Martin concludes that the good and 
bad cases have reasonably specific experiential commonalities (provided that the 
experience in the bad case is a causally matching hallucination). Second, the screening­
off argument: on the basis of considerations having to do with how best to account for 
certain phenomenal, cognitive, and behavioral commonalities across the cases, Martin 
concludes that the reasonably specific experiential commonalities are also fundamental. 
I will accept the first stage of Martin’s case against positive disjunctivism for the sake of 
argument.33 However, the second stage of the argument isn’t sound. To see this, it’s 
helpful to represent the screening‐off argument as follows: 
 
1. The good and bad cases have the reasonably specific experiential commonality 
of my perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped 
banana before me. (conclusion of the causal argument, given that we account 
for hallucination in terms of such representational properties) 
 
2. The good and bad cases have certain phenomenal, doxastic, and behavioral 
commonalities closely related to the experiences I have in those cases. 
(premise) 
 
3. These phenomenal, doxastic, and behavioral commonalities are best explained 
in terms of some other feature the cases have in common, e.g., my 
perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana 
before me. (screening‐off premise) 
 
4. If the phenomenal, doxastic, and behavioral features closely related to an 
experience are best explained in terms of X, then the experience 
fundamentally consists in X. (premise) 
 
5. The experiences in the good and bad cases fundamentally consist in my 
perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana 
before me. (from 2, 3, and 4) 
 
6. Contra disjunctivism, the experiences in the good and bad cases have a 
reasonably specific fundamental experiential commonality (from 1, 5) 
 
It seems that there is plenty of room for the positive disjunctivist to deny 
premise 4. That premise would have us move from the claim that the relevant class of 
phenomenal, doxastic, and behavioral features of the good case are best explained in 
terms of my representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before me to 
the claim that my experience in that case fundamentally consists in that 
                                                 
33 It’s not entirely clear that this stage of the argument is sound, however (e.g., see 
Johnston 2004: 138‐9). 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representational property (in other words, that the ultimate psychological fact in virtue 
of which the case has these features is my instantiating this representational property). 
Now, since the subject of debate is the metaphysics of perceptual experience, I have no 
qualms about moving from the claim that Y is best explained in terms of X to the claim 
that Y obtains in virtue of X (since the sense of ‘explanation’ in play here is plausibly 
metaphysical rather than, say, causal). However, just because Y obtains in virtue of X, it 
doesn’t follow that Y obtains ultimately in virtue of X (i.e., that Y fundamentally consists 
in X). For Y might obtain in virtue of X, which in turn obtains in virtue of Z. 
In terms of the example we’ve been working with, the following suggestion 
seems coherent (at least on the face of it): 
 
Bad case: The ultimate psychological fact in virtue of which it has the relevant 
class of phenomenal, behavioral, and doxastic features is my perceptually 
representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before me. 
 
Good case:  
o It has the relevant class of phenomenal, behavioral, and doxastic features 
in virtue of my perceptually representing that there is a yellow, crescent‐
shaped banana before me.  
o But the ultimate psychological fact in virtue of which I perceptually 
represent that there is a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana before me is the 
fact that I perceive the banana (and certain of its properties). 
 
Essentially, the idea is that just because the bad case experience fundamentally consists 
in this representational property, it doesn’t follow that the good case experience does—
even if both involve the instantiation of that property. For it is open to the positive 
disjunctivist to say that in the good case, the instantiation of the representational 
property obtains in virtue of a further psychological fact: viz., the fact that I see the 
banana. In short, the general form of the suggestion is that the sort of reasonably 
specific experiential properties that the positive disjunctivist will appeal to in order to 
account for hallucination might in some cases (i.e., good ones) be instantiated in virtue 
of the obtaining of the perceptual relation, while in others (i.e., hallucinatory bad ones) 
they are not instantiated in virtue of any other psychological property. Only in these 
latter cases will the reasonably specific experiential property in question be 
fundamental. In this way, the positive disjunctivist can deny that the good and 
hallucinatory bad cases have reasonably specific fundamental experiential 
commonalities. 
I have suggested that there is a region of logical space that the positive 
disjunctivist could occupy that has been overlooked in the screening‐off phase of 
Martin’s argument. But one might worry that this bit of logical space isn’t a very 
hospitable place for the positive disjunctivist to settle. In particular, one might be 
troubled by the idea that “…one thing can be fundamentally F, [and] something else can 
be F and yet not be fundamentally F” (Martin 2004: 61). For example, one might think it 
would be strange if hallucination fundamentally consisted in perceptual representation, 
while veridical experience consisted in perceptual representation but not fundamentally 
so. 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Note that this worry as stated applies to both positive and negative disjunctivism 
alike. For the negative disjunctivist holds that hallucination fundamentally consists in 
the property of being subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a 
certain kind, while veridical experience consists in this property but not fundamentally 
so. However, the negative disjunctivist has a ready reply to this worry: as we noted 
above, although my experience in the good case has the property of being subjectively 
indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a certain kind, the explanatory power of 
this property is dependent on that of being a veridical experience of that kind. The 
veridical experience has the indiscriminability property but does not fundamentally 
consist in this property because it also has another property (being a perceiving of a 
banana) that is clearly more psychologically basic. By contrast, since my experience in 
the bad case doesn’t have this other property, it could well fundamentally consist in the 
indiscriminability property. 
Now, one may not be entirely satisfied with this reply, but arguably it goes at 
least some way towards addressing the worry under discussion. However, it seems that 
the positive disjunctivist cannot give an analogous reply. If the experience in the 
hallucinatory case fundamentally consists in perceptual representation, or in 
acquaintance with immaterial sense‐data, it consists in properties that have 
explanatory power independently of veridical experience (as does the experience in the 
good case, thanks to the causal argument). For example, we might ask: what about my 
current perceptual experience makes it natural to form the belief that there is a yellow 
banana in front of me? One possible answer: because my experience consists in my 
perceptually representing my environment as containing such a banana. This 
explanation seems to work regardless of whether or not we can also give a viable 
explanation in terms of the fact that I see the banana. So it would seem that while 
negative disjunctivism may lose a bit of plausibility as a result of this worry, positive 
disjunctivism fares considerably worse. 
However, if we step back for a moment and consider the worry more carefully, it 
becomes less clear that it is all that worrying. The idea was that it would be strange if 
something could be fundamentally F while something else is F but not fundamentally so. 
Now, it’s not obvious that appeal to an abstract metaphysical principle in the absence of 
any argument for it should carry much dialectical force. We are perfectly entitled to ask 
why it should strike one as strange or surprising if something could be fundamentally F 
while something else is F but not fundamentally so. If the answer turns out to be that 
many of us simply have a deeply rooted aesthetic preference for symmetry in our 
metaphysics, then (arguably) the principle need not constrain our inquiry. In short, this 
worry is a genuine one only if the disjunctivist’s opponent can produce a compelling 
argument for the metaphysical principle at its core. The burden is on the disjunctivist’s 
opponent to show that the principle is true, rather than the burden being on the 
disjunctivist to show that it is false (contrary to what Martin seems to be suggesting in 
his 2004: 61). 
Nevertheless, there does seem to be an objection in the vicinity that is more 
troubling (at least on the face of it). According to the version of positive disjunctivism 
that I’ve sketched, in the good case I perceptually represent that there is a yellow 
banana before me in virtue of the fact that I perceive the banana before me—indeed, my 
perceiving this banana is the ultimate psychological fact in virtue of which my 
experience has all the other features it does (its phenomenal character, doxastic effects, 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etc.). Moreover, in the bad case, I also perceptually represent that there is a yellow 
banana before me. But there’s no further psychological fact in virtue of which this is the 
case. Presumably, it is the case in virtue of the fact that I am in a certain neurological 
state. The claim that there’s no further psychological fact in virtue of which I’m in this 
representational state in the bad case raises what seems to be a troubling question. If 
there’s no further psychological fact in virtue of which I’m in this representational state 
in the bad case, what positive reason is there to say that there is some such further 
psychological fact in the good case? The fact that I perceive the banana in the good case 
seems to be crammed into the experience’s metaphysical structure in a rather ad hoc 
manner just so we can rescue positive disjunctivism from Martin’s screening‐off 
argument. 
This prima facie attractive line of thought constitutes an understandable failure 
to grasp what’s become a painfully nuanced dialectic. In particular, the answer to the 
question posed in that line of thought—what reason is there for thinking that there is 
some further psychological fact in virtue of which I’m in the representational state in 
the good case?—has a straightforward answer. Namely: the reason for thinking that 
there is some further psychological fact in the good case is whatever reason we have for 
thinking Naïve Realism is true. We must not lose sight of the fact that the primary 
motivation for disjunctivism is Naïve Realism. Naïve Realism says that the experience in 
the good case fundamentally consists in my perceiving the banana, i.e., that all other 
psychological features of this experience ultimately obtain in virtue of the fact that I 
perceive the banana. Whatever reason we have for thinking this is true is ipso facto a 
reason for thinking that the obtaining of the perceptual relation is part of the 
metaphysical structure of the good case experience, and that it is the ultimate 
psychological fact in virtue of which I perceptually represent that there is a yellow 
banana in front of me. 
Of course, for all I’ve said here, it could be the case that there’s no good reason to 
think that Naïve Realism is true. Whether there’s any good reason to endorse Naïve 
Realism is a contentious issue that I don’t have the space to discuss here—that issue 
deserves a paper (perhaps even a book) of its own. But in this paper, I’ve set out to 
answer the following rather restricted question: assuming that Naïve Realism is worth 
at least keeping on the table as a live option, but also that negative disjunctivism is false, 
is there any hope for disjunctivism? I hope to have said enough to convince the reader 
that this question should be answered in the affirmative. But of course, the assumptions 
made in restricting the question require further examination in their own right. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I began this paper by refining the formulation of disjunctivism so as to render it as the 
weakest claim the Naïve Realist must commit to in order to preserve her account of 
veridical experience. The result was a view compatible with all sorts of commonalities 
across the good and bad cases—even reasonably specific experiential commonalities, 
and even “substantive” ones (e.g.. not just my having a perceptual experience as of a 
yellow, crescent‐shaped banana, but also my perceptually representing my environment 
as being a certain way). What’s crucial for the Naïve Realist is that reasonably specific 
experiential commonalities are not fundamental; that in the good case, any reasonably 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specific experiential feature the good case has in common with the bad one obtains in 
virtue of my bearing the perceptual relation to the banana. 
This refinement of disjunctivism puts it in a good position to avoid some of the 
most compelling objections that have been raised against the view. In particular, as I 
argued in section 2, this version of disjunctivism can explain why what it is like for me 
to hallucinate a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana can be the same as what it is like for me 
to veridically perceive the banana on my desk. And, as I argued in section 3, it can 
explain why the hallucination I have in the bad case is subjectively indistinguishable 
from a veridical experience of a yellow, crescent‐shaped banana. Perhaps most 
importantly, it can be elaborated in terms of positive disjunctivism, thus allowing the 
Naïve Realist to eschew negative disjunctivism and all the difficulties it brings. 
Of course, I’ve only just sketched what such a positive disjunctivism might look 
like. Since a lot of conceptual ground‐clearing was required to even bring that position 
into view, I’ve only been able to argue for a new research program rather than a fully 
articulated position. But given that Naïve Realism is a view worth taking seriously, and 
that it requires endorsing some form of disjunctivism, this is a research program that 
both the disjunctivist and her opponents should explore. 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